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that her domicile was still in New Hampshire since she did not have the
necessary intent to make her real "home" there but only to establish a
legal domicile there in order to accomplish an outside motive. It has been
often held that the removal to another place coupled with a statement
that the latter place is one's domicile is insufficient to establish legal
domicile. Bartlett v. Town of Boston, 93 Atl. 796; and cases collected in
3 Dec. Dig. Vol. 11, pp. 6-8. It is imperative that the intent be present
to make the place of removal a true home and that intent must be ascer-
tained by a consideration of all facts and circumstances. State v. Red Oak
Bank, 267 S. W. 566; Swift & Co. v. Licklider, 7 F. (2d) 19.
From a review of these authorities it appears that the Appellate Court
has adopted and accurately applied the rules rendered practically uniform
by prior decisions in this and other jurisdictions. H. W. S.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS - CONSTITUTIONAL IAW - CRIMINAL LAW -
DouBin JEoPARIwY-This was a prosecution under sections 4 and 6, c. 48,
Acts 1925, sections 2717, 2719, Burns Ann. St. 1926, by an affidavit in
two counts, the first count charging that appellant and his wife, as to
whom the action was later dismissed, did "unlawfully have in their pos-
session intoxicating liquor," and the second count charging that at the
same time and place they did "unlawfully and feloniously have in their
possession, under their control and their use, a still and distilling apparatus
for the unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor." Appellant, who
was convicted on each count and on the first count was fined $100 and
sentenced to 30 days in the Delaware county jail, and on the second count
was fined $100 and sentenced to imprisonment of not less than one year
nor more than five years in the Indiana State Prison, contends that "the
same acts of the defendant constitute the offense charged in the two
separate counts of the affidavit," and that only the first sentence imposed
can be enforced. Held, that the contention is without merit. Lawson v.
State, Supreme Court of Indiana, July 21, 1931, 177 N. E. 266.
The Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution provides "* * *
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb * * *" Article I, sec. 14 of the Indiana Con-
stitution provides, "No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same
offense * * *"
The provisions of the Federal Constitution, of course, protect the indi-
vidual only against actions brought in the name of the federal sovereignty,
and he must rely on the state Constitution for protection in the case of
actions brought in the name of the state. In discussing the question, con-
sideration may be given to two phases of the problem: (1) Acts which
contravene the laws of the same sovereign; (2) Acts which contravene
the laws of different sovereigns.
It is not a violation of a constitutional provision against double jeopardy
on an indictment for particular offenses, when a defendant is found guilty
of a lesser offense, secures a new trial, and then is found guilty of the
greater offense. Jones v. State, 109 So. 265; State v. Ash, 122 Pac. 995;
Trono v. United States, 199 U. S. 52. This seems to be the trend of modern
decisions, altho the weight of authority is probably contra. Peocle v.
McGinnis, 234 Ill. 68. The matter has been covered by statute in some
states. The fundamental principle that no person shall twice be put in
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jeopardy for the same offense is everywhdre recognized as a right of law
and equity. Whatley v. State, 84 So. 860; Rupert v. State, 131 Pac. 713.
This immunity from second jeopardy granted by the constitutions is a
personal privilege, and the accused may waive it. Blocher v. State, 177
Ind. 356, 98 N. E. 118; State v. White, 71 Kan. 356, 80 Pac. 589. Such a
waiver may be express or implied. State.v. White, supra. An appeal by
the accused operates is a waiver of the plea of former jeopardy on a
second trial. State v. Kessler, 49 Pac. 293; United States v. Ball, 163 U.
S. 662. The conflict of authority arises as to the extent of such waiver.
Wharton's Criminal Procedure, 10th Ed. Vol. II, Sec. 1426 ff. The dis-
charge of a jury in criminal case, because of their inability to agree on a
verdict, after a protracted deliberation, does not entitle the defendant to
his discharge on the ground that he has been once in jeopardy. State V.
Nelson, 26 Ind. 366; Shaffer v. State, 27 Ind. 131. But when accused is
put on trial on a valid indictment, before a legal jury, and the jury is
discharged by the court, without good cause, and without the consent of
the defendant, he has incurred the first peril, and the discharge of the
jury is equivalent to a verdict of not guilty. State v. Walker, 26 Ind. 346.
When a jury which is deliberating is taken into the public square by a
bailiff, who there gives them a can of beer which he has procured from
the defendant's saloon without knowledge of the court, the jury may be
discharged over the defendant's objection, and this having been done, the
defendant may be discharged as having been once in jeopardy. State V.
Leunig, 42 Ind. 541. When a jury, in the course of its deliberations,
discovers that one of the jurymen is not a resident of the county, and
therefore disperses without giving notice to the court, or to any of the
parties, and the court makes no effort to re-assemble them, the defendant
is entitled to a discharge, having been once put in jeopardy. Maden V.
Emmons, 83 Ind. 331. A defendant who by appeal or habeas corpus
causes a second sentence to be imposed on himself will not be heard to
claim having been twice in jeopardy. Ex parte Bouchard, 38 Cal. App.
441, 176 Pac. 692; Commonwealth v. Murphey, 174 Mass. 369, 54 N. E.
860. See 6 Ind. L. J. 576 (1931).
Punishment is customarily interpreted not to include payments exacted
in civil proceedings. Even though the act be a crime, imposition of com-
pensatory damages is apparently unquestioned under the theory that this is
a mere reparation to the injured individual. Some courts, however, refuse
to allow punitive damages as well, arguing that the amount in excess
of the plaintiff's loss is demanded for injury to the state. Wabash Print-
ing and Publishing Co. v. Crumrine, 123 Ind. 89, 21 N. E. 904; Shufakiss
v. Duray, 85 Ind. App. 426, 154 N. E. 289. Most courts do not recognize
this distinction. Bundy v. Maginess, 76 Cal. 352; Hauser v. Griffith, 102
Iowa 215, 71 N. W. 223; Wersing v. Smith, 222 Pa. 8, 70 Atl. 906; Luther
v. Shaw, 157 Wis. 234, 147 N. W. 18. Under another view, the state, as
plaintiff, may collect a penalty after punishment by fine and imprisonment,
where the three are provided by statute. People v. Snyder, 90 App. Div.
422, 86 N. Y. S. 415. The federal courts do not allow two personal
actions, United States v. Choteau, 102 U. S. 603; United States v. Ulrice,
102 U. S. 612; but permit a proceeding in rem for a forfeiture after con-
viction (an acquittal is conclusive against the government, Coffey v. United
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States, 116 U. S. 436, 6 Sup. Ct. 437) for the crime. United States v.
Three Copper Stills, 47 Fed. 495.
The legislature may make one act a number of crimes, but does not
have the power to call the very same facts by different names and create
separate offenses. State v. Speedling, 183 N. W. 310. The prosecutor
must elect on which charge he will rely if the offenses are the same within
the constitutional prohibition. Savage v. State, 92 So. 19; Newton v.
Commonwealth, 249 S. W. 1017. The test is whether or not proof of the
requisites to support either offense contains proof of all facts necessary
to convict of the other. Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433. If not,
both may be punished. Thus, there is no question of the power to make
repetitions of an act on one occasion separate offenses. Eberling v.
Morgan, 237 U. S. 625, 35 Sup. Ct. 710. But frequently in construing the
statute, the courts find that only one offense has been committed. United
States v. Adams, 281 U. S. 202; Jackson v. State, 14 Ind. 327. It may
also mark off one section of a transaction as one offense, and the acts
following as another, though the latter be the object, but not the neces-
sary result, for which the first was committed. Morgan v. Devine, 237
U. S. 632. Or, the offenses, though concurrent, may be distinct, if an
additional fact must be proved to convict of each, which is not required
in proof of the other. Albrecht v. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. 250. A
conviction on two such charges does not result in double punishment
because the offenses are separate and distinct. Thompson v. State, 89 Ind.
App. 555, 167 N. E. 345. Woodworth v. State, 185 Ind. 582, 114 N. E. 86;
State v. Graham, 73 Iowa, 553, 35 N. W. 628; Commonwealth v. McCabe,
163 Mass. 98, 39 N. E. 777. Where one of such offenses is a misdemeanor
and the other a felony, and upon trial the defendant is convicted of both,
he has not been twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. Pivak v.
State, 202 Ind. -, 175 N. E. 278. Different crimes of the same character
growing out of the same transaction may be joined in separate counts of
the same affidavit. Campbell v. State, 197 Ind. 112, 149 N. E. 903; Rvkvio
v. State, 194 Ind. 450, 143 N. E. 357; Glover v. State, 109 Ind. 391, 10
N. E. 282. However, some courts hold that a common essential ingredient
established identity. State v. Mowser, 106 Atl. 416. A few cases impose
the requirement that every necessary fact must be common to both charges
for the second to be barred. Schultz v. Biddle, 19 Fed. (2d) 478; People
v. Nelson, 319 Ill. 386, 150 N. E. 249. A conviction for assault does not
bar prosecution for manslaughter where the victim died after the first
judgment. Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442. A suit for an injunction
against the violation of a statute and punishment for contempt of such
injunction, in addition to a criminal prosecution for the illegal act, do
not violate the constitutional provision against putting a person twice in
jeopardy. State ex rel. Duensing v. Roby, 142 Ind. 168.
As a second consideration, an act which contravenes the law of different
sovereigns may be recognized in the courts of each as a distinct offense.
Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312; United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377.
So, in transporting liquor across several states, a person may be liable on
a charge of transportation in any of the several states crossed, and by
the federal government.
By asserted analogy, conduct violating a state statute and a city
ordinance may be the basis of two prosecutions. Hughes v. People, 9 Pac.
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50; Robbins v. State, 95 Ill. 175; State v. Lee, 13 N. W. 913. The analogy
cannot be supported, however, where the city governments are the creations
of the legislature, as was decided in McInerny v. City of Denver, 17 Colo.
302, 29 Pac. 516, and in Ogden v. City of.Madison, 87 N. W. 568. (Where
the court reached the amazing decision that the offense against the city
being distinct from that against the state, as perpetrated against a differ-
ent sovereignty, the constitutional rights guaranteed to a violator of a
state law did not extend to a prosecution for violation of a city ordinance.)
However, the rule allowing two punishments under ordinance and statute
seems firmly established. Sfate v. Tucker, 242 Pac. 363, (the court, being
confronted with the question for the first time; expressed doubt as to the
soundness of the rule, but followed it as the weight of authority.) In
some cases upholding this doctrine the Indiana case of Levy v. State, 6 Ind.
281, is cited as an authority; the case, however, is not in point, the legis-
lature having empowered city councils to pass ordinances providing for
a penalty to be secured in a civil action, and this was held to be no bar
to a criminal prosecution for the same act under a criminal, statute. The
doctrine has never been accepted by the federal government. Grafton v.
United States, 206 U. S. 333, 27 Sup. Ct. 749, (holding conviction under
a Philippine law was a bar to prosecution under a federal statute.) Some
states refuse to allow its application. Dowling v. City of Troy, 173 Ala.
468, 56 So. 118; Richardson v. State, 56 Ark. 367, 19 S. W. 1052; Respass
v. Commonwealth, 107 Ky. 139, 53 S. W. 24; White v. Commonwealth, 122
Ky. 408, 92 S. W. 285; Ex parte Freeland, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 359, 42 S. W. 295;
Davis v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 359, 38 S. W. 616, 39 S. W. 937; Morganstern
v. Commonwealth, 94 Va. 787, 26 S. E. 402.
The doctrine of the principal case of allowing separate actions on
separate phases of the same transaction seems firmly intrenched by the
authorities cited above, and seems to be correct in principle. Quaere: Could
this doctrine subject a defendant, because of one transaction, to the work-
ing of one of the habitual criminal statutes, or to increased penalties for
second offenders? L. H. W.
MECHANIC'S LINs--WAvER--RvVAL AFTER WAIVER-An action to
foreclose mechanic's lien. The building contract provided that, "the con-
tractor agrees to waive and does hereby waive and relinquish all right to
a lien upon the real estate herein above described and the building to be
erected thereon * * *; and the contractor expressly agrees that no
lien shall attach to the real estate, building, structure or any other im-
provement of the owner, either on behalf of the contractor herein, or in
behalf of the subcontractors, mechanics, etc., and the said contractor
does hereby expressly waive all rights to any such lien under the laws
of the State of Indiana for and on behalf of themselves and all materials
* * * for the erection, construction and completion of said building."
The contract was breached by the owner by its refusal to make certain
installment payments to the contractor as required by the contract. The
trial court stated as conclusion of law that the covenant of the contractor
"against mechanic's lien on the property of the owner was dependent upon
the covenant of the owner to perform its part of the contract as the work
progressed and by reason of the owner's breach of contract" the con-
tractor was "released from the covenant against mechanic's liens contained
